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Hars´ anyi introduced the concept of type space in an intuitive way.
Later Heifetz and Samet formalized it. Hars´ anyi used conditional prob-
abilities to model the beliefs of the players, Heifetz and Samet avoided
using conditional probabilities formally. We show that in both cases the
concept of transition probability can reproduce the models, moreover, the
transition probability approach ﬁts to both Hars´ anyi’s intuition and the
formalization of Heifetz and Samet. As a consequence, our results suggest
that the concept of common prior is not appropriate to determine the
players’ beliefs. Two examples are also given.
1 Introduction
In his celebrated paper Hars´ anyi [2] introduced the concept of types space to
model games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. In his
original work and in textbooks as well conditional probabilities are used for
deducing the beliefs of the players from the common prior.
It is known that the conditional probability of an arbitrary ﬁxed event is a set
of random variables (the Radon-Nikodym derivative) which is deﬁned only up
to sets of measure zero, so it is an element of L1. Therefore, there can be many
variants of the conditional probability, which are coincide ”only” almost surely.
The main disadvantage of conditional probability is that it is not deﬁned that,
which variants of the conditional probability are the players’ beliefs. In other
words, the common prior does not contain the information that the players’
beliefs do.
Furthermore, the transition probability, which can be deﬁned as a variant
of the conditional probability, can determine exactly the players’ beliefs at any
type, so it is well deﬁned, it goes with Hars´ anyi’s intuition.
Heifetz and Samet [3] formalized the so called Hars´ anyi type space. Their
formalization avoid to use the common prior assumption and conditional prob-
abilities, so it does not share the problems mentioned above. We show that
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1their model can be built on the concept of transition probability, therefore their
model also ﬁts to our suggestion.
Our two examples illustrate the inappropriateness of conditional probability.
Both examples use inﬁnite type sets, none of our counterexamples can be sim-
pliﬁed to ﬁnite model, in both examples the measurable structure does matter.
We interpret this feature of our examples, as these examples are based on the
cognitive constraints of the players.
Nevertheless, our counterexamples shed some light on a general problem of
conditional probability. It is commonly believed that conditional probability
answers question like: what is the probability of event A if event B happens.
However, the conditional probability can answer the questions for which the
probability space contains the information needed. However, in general the
model (probability space) does not contains the information for the answer. If
we want to get answers for questions like mentioned above, then ﬁrst we have
to build the answer into the model, so we need to know the answer before. See
the following short example as an illustration.
We have a 6cl glass of cocktail which cocktail is two colored, the upper half
(3cl) is green and the lower half is red. We use a plastic pipe to get 1cl sample
from the drink. We put it in the drink randomly, and we get a one colored
sample (we assume that if the lower end of the plastic pipe is in the green
part of the drink, then the whole sample is one colored, green, and if it is in
the red part of the drink, then the sample is also one colored, red. What is
the probability that we get a 1cl red sample, if we previously got an other 1cl
sample which was green? In other words, what is the probability of getting a
red sample conditional on we have already got a green sample before?
One could calculate in such a way that if we got a green sample before, then
there are 3cl red and 2cl green components in the drink, so the answer is 3/5.
However, this argument is totally wrong, since we do not know what happens
after we get the ﬁrst sample, e.g. it is possible that if the balance between the
two components ends, then the drink becomes a yellow mass. The assumption
that, there will be 3cl red and 2cl green components in the drink is not from
the description of the problem. Actually, the description of the problem does
not contain the information what happens after we get the ﬁrst sample, so the
correct answer is: we cannot answer this question.
Summing up, the conditional probability is much less than it is commonly
believed. One can think that our example above is only a trick with the words,
but our examples later demonstrate that it is not the case. In spite of our
examples’ inﬁnitary feature, as we demonstrated, the informational problem
discussed above appears in ﬁnite models as well. Our examples only emphasize
the problem, which we cannot formalize in a ﬁnite model.
In the next section we give our two examples. In the third section we show
that Heifetz and Samet’s deﬁnition of type space can be deduced from transition
probabilities (Theorem 21.). In the last section we summarize our results, and
introduce a slight modiﬁcation of Heifetz and Samet’s deﬁnition of Hars´ anyi type
space, which formalization emphasizes our suggestion: the concept of transition
probability.
22 The examples
The following two examples are counterexamples, and they show two kinds of
failure of conditional probability. We present here two, instead of one coun-
terexample, because the second counterexample calls for the use of the axiom of
choice, and we want to give counterexamples with and without axiom of choice
as well.
2.1 The ﬁrst example
The following example demonstrates that, conditional probabilities cannot be
used for determining the players’ beliefs.
Denote i,j the two players, and assume that the uncertainties stem from the
players only. The sets the players’ types are Ti, Tj such that Ti = Tj = [0,1].
The measurable structures of the type sets Mi, Mj are the Borel sets of [0,1],
therefore, (Ti,Mi) = (Tj,Mj) are the type sets of the players respectively. Let
(T,M) = (Ti × Tj,Mi ⊗ Mj) be the set of states of the world. Denote p the
common prior, where p is the Lebesgue measure on (T,M), hence (T,M,p) is
a probability measure space.
It is our aim to determine the conditional probabilities on any point of Ti
(we deﬁne what we mean on this later). The problem is that, p(pr
−1
i ({ti})) = 0
∀ti ∈ Ti (where pri denotes the coordinate projection from T to Ti), so we
cannot calculate the conditional probability by the intuitive way, we mean the







is meaningless, since the denominator is
zero, where A ∈ M.
The information, which is available for player i can be represented by the
σ-algebra pr
−1
i (Mi), therefore we are interested in a conditional probability on
this σ-algebra.
Deﬁnition 1. The function f0
i : T × M → R is a conditional probability on
pr
−1
i (Mi) (henceforth f0
i(· | pr
−1





2. p(A ∩ B) =
R
B f0
i(·,A) dp ∀B ∈ pr
−1
i (Mi).
The existence of conditional probability is a direct corollary of the existence
of the Radon-Nikodym derivative. However, it is easy to see that, the condi-
tional probability is deﬁned up to measure zero sets, so strictly speaking, the
conditional probability is a set of functions, a point in L1(p).
In our special case (product space case) we can deﬁne the conditional prob-
ability in an alternative way:
Deﬁnition 2. Let pi(B) $ p(pr
−1
i (B)) ∀B ∈ Mi. It is easy to see that pi is a
probability measure on (Ti,Mi). The function fi : Ti ×M → R is a conditional
probability on Mi (henceforth fi(· | Mi)), if ∀A ∈ M
1. fi(·,A) is Mi-measurable,




B fi(·,A) dpi ∀B ∈ Mi.
3Since the conditional probability is some set of functions, we can speak
about variants of it. However, there are variants of the conditional probability
fi(· | Mi) which are not measures at a ﬁxed point x ∈ Ti. As a result, the
conditional probability is not a probability measure at all.
Deﬁnition 3. Conditional probability fi(· | Mi) is regular, if there is such a
function f : Ti × M → [0,1] that
1. f(·,A) = fi(A | Mi) pi-a.s. ∀A ∈ M,
2. f(x,·) is a probability measure on M ∀x ∈ Ti.
In the next step, we deﬁne such two variants of our conditional probability
that they meet points 1. and 2. in the deﬁnition above. We deﬁne them on the
so called measurable rectangles (sets with form Ai × Aj, Ai ∈ Mi, Aj ∈ Mj)
only, since at any ﬁxed x ∈ Ti these functions are probability measures, so these
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i (x,A), if x 6= t∗
i





It is easy to see that f1
i coincides with f2
i except on the point t∗
i, where f2
i is a
Dirac measure concentrated on t∗
i ×t∗
j. It is also obvious that f1
i (·,A) = f2
i (·,A)
pi-a.s. ∀A ∈ M.
Now, we repeat our above argument, but we use density functions instead
of probability measures (probability distributions).
Let x, y denote the points in Ti and Tj respectively. It easy to see that, the
function f(x,y) = 1 is a density function of probability p deﬁned above. Then,
we follow Hars´ anyi (p. 174, equations (5.2), (5.3)):




By slight calculation we get the density function of the conditional probability
f(y | x) = 1.
It seems contradicting our result above. However, the distribution function
is also deﬁned only up to (p) measure zero sets, so the function




f(y | x), if x 6= t∗
i
1, if x = t∗
i and y = t∗
j
0, otherwise
is also a density function of the conditional probability (it is the density function
of a diﬀerent variant of the conditional probability). Moreover, the two functions
f(y | x) = g(y | x) p-a.s., f(y | t∗
i) 6= g(y | t∗
i) p-a.s., so they are diﬀerent at t∗
i.
4To sum up, we have got two diﬀerent beliefs for player i at type t∗
i, and both
beliefs are consistent with the common prior p. In other worlds, the players’
beliefs cannot be determined by the common prior, some additional information
is needed.
Hars´ anyi wrote (p. 174): ”The only diﬀerence is that in G the probabilities
used by each player are subjective probabilities whereas on G∗ these probabilities
are objective (conditional) probabilities. But by the Bayesian hypothesis this
diﬀerence is immaterial.”
Unfortunately, our result above suggests that the diﬀerence is material.
In addition to, according to Hars´ anyi’s ”deﬁnition” of type, it contains all
information we need to determine the beliefs of any player. However, since
the players’ beliefs cannot be deduced from the common prior unambiguously,
the model which based on the beliefs is not equivalent to the game based on
the common prior. We think that this feature of conditional probability (non-
uniqueness) does not go with Hars´ anyi’s intuition.
2.2 The second example
This example, which is based on Halmos’ example [1], demonstrates that it is
possible that the common prior not only do not determine the players’ beliefs
unambiguously, but there are no beliefs of the players which consistent with
the common prior. In other words, we deﬁne such a probability space, which
is a product space (the product of the two type sets of the players Ti, Tj), and
there is no regular conditional probability (belief) on the measurable structure
generated by pri (information available for player i).
Denote i and j the two players, and let Ti = Ti = [0,1] be the sets of types
of the players i and j respectively, and let T = Ti × Tj. Let Mi = B([0,1]),
Mj = σ(B([0,1])∪{M}), where M is a thick set1 w.r.t. λ the Lebesgue measure
on B([0,1]). Let M = Mi ⊗ Mj, F : [0,1] → [0,1] × [0,1] be such a function
that F(x) = (x,x) ∀x ∈ [0,1].
Lemma 4. ∀A ∈ σ(B([0,1]) ∪ {M}) ∃B1,B2 ∈ B([0,1]) such that
A = (B1 ∩ M) ∪ (B2 ∩ {M).
Proof. Left for the reader. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. σ(B([0,1]) ∪ {M}) = F−1(M).
Proof. It is clear that diag([0,1] × [0,1]) ∈ B([0,1] × [0,1]) ⊆ M. Then
F−1(M) = F−1(M ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1])), hence it is enough to concentrate on
the measurable structure of the diagonal. M∩diag([0,1]×[0,1]) = diag([0,1]×
[0,1]) ∩ pr
−1
j (Mj), so F−1(M) = σ(B([0,1]) ∪ {M}). Q.E.D.
Deﬁnition 6. Let µ be such a probability measure on σ(B([0,1]) ∪ {M}) that
µ(A) = λ(B1) ∀A ∈ σ(B([0,1]) ∪ {M}), where B1 ∈ B([0,1]) from Lemma 4.
Let p $ µ ◦ F−1 then
(T,M,p)
is a probability measure space.
1The thick set M is such a set that λ∗(M) = 1 and λ∗(M) = 0, where λ∗ and λ∗ are the
outer and inner measure respectively, generated by λ.
5Remark 7. It is easy to see that in this example λ(B) = p(pr
−1
i (B)) ∀B ∈ M,
so pi is the Lebesgue measure on B([0,1]) in Deﬁntion 2.
Proposition 8. The conditional probability fi(· | Mi) (see Deﬁnition 2.) is
not regular, i.e. there is no fi : Ti × M → [0,1] function such that
1. fi(·,A) = fi(A | Mi) pi-a.s. ∀A ∈ M,
2. fi(x,·) probability measure on M ∀x ∈ Ti.
We split the proof into lemmata.
Assume indirectly that, there is such a function fi that, it meets points 1.
and 2. in Proposition 8.
Lemma 9. Let N = pr
−1
j (M)∩diag([0,1]×[0,1]), and let D = {x | fi(x,N) 6=
1}, then λ(D) = 0.
Proof. Since fi is a variant of the conditional probability on Mi, f(·,N) is
Mi-measurable, so D ∈ B([0,1]) = Mi.
Since D ∈ B([0,1]), p(pr
−1
i (D) ∩ N) = p(pr
−1
i (D) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1])) =
p(pr
−1





1 dp = p(pr
−1




From the deﬁnition of conditional probability (Deﬁnition 2.)
p(pr
−1











Since f(x,N) ≤ 1
pi({x ∈ D | f(x,N) 6= 1}) = 0.
However, f(x,N) = 1 ∀x / ∈ D, so
pi({x ∈ Ti | f(x,M) 6= 1}) = 0,
therefore, since pi is the Lebesgue measure λ(D) = 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 10. Let R = {[a,b) | a,b ∈ Q[0,1], a ≥ b}, and E = {x | ∃A ∈
R, f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) 6= 1A}, then λ(E) = 0.
Proof. Let A ∈ R be arbitrary ﬁxed, and let EA = {x | f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) 6= 1A}.
Since f(·,pr
−1
i (A)) is Mi-measurable, so EA ∈ B([0,1]).




i (A)) dpi = p(pr
−1
i (A) ∩ T) = p(pr
−1







i (A)) dpi = p(pr
−1
i (A)) = pi(A)
=
R
A 1A dpi =
R
Ti 1A dp.
6Therefore, since 0 ≤ f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) ≤ 1 so f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) = 1A pi-a.s., pi(EA) =
0 and λ(EA) = 0.
We know that the cardinality of R is countable, λ is σ-additive and E =
∪A∈REA, so λ(E) = 0 Q.E.D.
Lemma 11. f(x,pr
−1
i ({x})) = 1 ∀x ∈ {E.
Proof. Let x ∈ {E be arbitrary ﬁxed, and let (An)n∈N ⊆ R be such a sequence
of sets that An ⊇ An+1 ∀n and ∩nAn = {x} (∩npr
−1
i (An) = pr
−1
i ({x})). Then,
since we assumed that f(x,·) is a probability measure, and from Lemma 10.
f(x,pr
−1
i (An)) = 1 ∀n, so f(x,pr
−1
i ({x})) = 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12. pr
−1
i ({D ∩ {E) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1]) ⊆ N.
Proof. Let x ∈ {D∩{E be arbitrary ﬁxed. Since f(x,N) = 1, f(x,pr
−1
i ({x})) =
1, p(diag([0,1] × [0,1])) = 1 and f(x,·) is a probability measure
f(x,N ∩ pr
−1
i ({x}) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1])) = 1
⇒ N ∩ pr
−1
i ({x}) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1]) 6= ∅
⇒ pr
−1
i ({x}) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1]) ∈ N.
Q.E.D.
The proof of proposition 8. Since lemmata 9., 10., 11. and 12. pi({D∩{E) = 1
and pr
−1
i ({D ∩ {E) ∩ diag([0,1] × [0,1]) ⊆ N. However, it is a contradiction
since M is a thick set w.r.t. λ on B([0,1]), and {D ∩ {E ∈ B([0,1]). Q.E.D.
To sum up, in this example there is no regular conditional probability of
player i, so her beliefs cannot ﬁt to the common prior p.
Remark 13. Halmos’ construction diﬀers from ours a little bit. He suggests
the reader to prove that the set
{x | ∃A ∈ B([0,1]), f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) 6= 1A}
is a Lebesgue measure zero set. It is too strong for the construction, so in
Lemma 10. and 11. we proved less. It also easy to prove Halmos’ original
suggestion, it goes as the proof of Lemma 11., i.e. it is enough to prove that
∀x ∈ {E f(x,pr
−1
i (A)) = 1A for any A from the monotone class generated by
R (B([0,1])).
3 The deﬁnition of type space
In this section we introduce the concept of type space formally. We use the
formalism of Heifetz and Samet, and we show that the underpinning idea of
their deﬁnition is the transition probability.
At the beginning of this section we follow Heifetz and Samet [3].
Deﬁnition 14. Let (X,M) be an arbitrary measurable space. Let the measur-
able structure of (∆(X,M),AHS) be the σ-ﬁeld generated by the sets O = {µ ∈
∆(X,M) | µ(A) ≥ α}, where ∆(·) is for the set of probability measures on the
given measurable space, A ∈ M, and α ∈ [0,1] is arbitrary ﬁxed.
7Deﬁnition 15 (Heifetz and Samet). The type space < (Ti,Mi)i∈M∪{0},m
i∈M > (brieﬂy < (T,M), m) >) based on parameter space S is as follows
(where M is the set of players, and 0 denotes the extra player):
1. T0 = S, (Ti,Mi) is a measurable space ∀i ∈ M ∪ {0},
2. mi : Ti → (∆(T,M),AHS) is a measurable function ∀i ∈ M,
3. mi(ti)|∆(Ti,Mi) = δti, where δti is the Dirac measure concentrated on ti,
∀ti ∈ Ti.
Thus, the type space consists of the types of the players and functions which
make the connection between types and the beliefs of any given player. Next,
let us see the deﬁnition of a transition probability:
Deﬁnition 16. Let (X,M) be an arbitrary ﬁxed measurable space, and let
f : X ×M → ([0,1],B([0,1])) be a function, where B(·) is for the Borel sets. If
• ∀x ∈ X f(x,·) is a probability measure on (X,M),
• ∀A ∈ M f(·,A) is a measurable function,
then we call function f a transition probability.
The transition probability has all the properties and more, of regular condi-
tional probability. It is easy to see that the measure zero events do not cause
any problems for transition probability.
Deﬁnition 17. Let us introduce some notations:
1. M is the set of active players excluding 0 (nature),
2. 0 is an extra player,
3. (Ti,Mi) is a measurable space ∀i ∈ M ∪ {0},
4. (T,M) = (Πi∈M∪{0}Ti,⊗i∈M∪{0}Mi),
5. fi : Ti × M → [0,1] is a transition probability ∀i ∈ M.
It is clear that, Ti’s are the type sets, and the transition probability capture
the way how the players form their beliefs.
Deﬁnition 18. Let mi = (ΠA∈Mfi(·,A))|diag(T M
i ), so mi : diag(TM
i ) →
∆(T,M), in other words mi : Ti → ∆(T,M) ∀i ∈ M.
Functions mi determines the beliefs belong to the given types.
Example 19. Let M = {∅,T}, and let Ti = {t1,t2}. Then ΠA∈Mfi(·,A) =
fi(·,∅) × fi(·,T), so e.g. mi(t1) = {µ(∅)} × {µ(T)}, where µ is a probability
measure on M.
Lemma 20. ∀i ∈ M mi is B([0,1])M-measurable.
Proof. It is clear that the natural embedding b : diag(TM
i ) → TM
i is a measur-
able function. fi(·,A) → [0,1] is a measurable function ∀A ∈ M, so ΠA∈Mfi(·,
A) is also measurable function w.r.t B([0,1])M. We know that mi = (ΠA∈M
fi(·,A)) ◦ b, so mi is a measurable function. Q.E.D.
8Theorem 21. Heifetz and Samet’s measurable structure AHS (deﬁnition 14.)
coincide with the measurable structure B([0,1])M on (T,M).
Proof. Let A ∈ M be arbitrary, ﬁxed. If A = ∅, or A = X, then the proof is
ﬁnished. In the following, we assume that A does not coincide with both of the
sets above.
Let O = {µ ∈ ∆(T,M) | µ(A) ≥ α}, then {O = {µ ∈ ∆(T,M) | µ(A) <
α}. We know that ∃ν ∈ ∆(T,M) such that ν(A) = 0, then U(ν,A) = {µ ∈
∆(T,M) | |ν(A) − µ(A)| < α}, U(ν,A) = {O, or O = {U(ν,A).
Let U(ν,A) = {µ ∈ ∆(T,M) | |ν(A) − µ(A)| ≥ α} for arbitrary ν, α. Let
p1 = min{ν(A) + α,1}, and let p2 = max{ν(A) − α,0}. Denote O1 = {µ ∈
∆(T,M) | µ({A) ≥ 1 − p2}. It is easy to see that O1 = {µ ∈ ∆(T,M) |
µ(A) < p2}. Let an be such a strictly decreasing sequence that an ∈ [0,1] ∀n,
and an → p1, and let O2 = ∪n{µ ∈ ∆(T,M) | µ(A) > an}. Then O2 = {µ ∈
∆(T,M) | µ(A) > p1}, so U(ν,A) = {(O1 ∪ O2).
We proved that the set systems which generate the two measurable structures
coincide. Q.E.D.
Remark 22. In the proof of theorem 21. we used intensively that the range of
the measures is the unit interval of R.
In the discussion above the starting points were the sets of types (Ti) and
the transition probabilities (fi). We take these sets and functions as given, we
do not care about the existence of them.
4 Conclusions
To sum up, since the conditional probability does not determine the players’
beliefs unambiguously, hence for determining the players’ beliefs we need extra
information. This extra information can be formalized by transition probabili-
ties.
Finally, we suggest a slight modiﬁcation of Heifetz and Samet’s deﬁnition
(deﬁnition 15.) as follows:
Deﬁnition 23. The type space < (Ti,Mi)i∈M∪{0},fi∈M > (brieﬂy < (T,M),
f) >) based on parameter space S is as follows:
1. T0 = S, (Ti,Mi) is a measurable space ∀i ∈ M ∪ {0},
2. fi : Ti × M → [0,1] is a transition probability function ∀i ∈ M,
3. suppfi(ti,·) = pr
−1
i ({ti}) ∀ti ∈ Ti ∀i ∈ M.
The above deﬁnition emphasizes the basic method of the reasoning of the
players more, and is not more complicated any way.
It is important to see that, we must not use the concept of common prior to
make a complete information game from an incomplete information game. Even
if we can deﬁne the transition probabilities as variants of the conditional prob-
abilities of the common prior in the above deﬁnition, probability distribution
on the product of the type sets does not contain all information that transition
probabilities do. Therefore, in general, we cannot summarize the reasoning of
the players into a model in which there are only the type sets and the common
9prior. In other words, from cognitive viewpoint the model with common prior
and the model with transition probabilities (which can ﬁt to the common prior)
are not equivalent.
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